The management of internationally shared fish stocks is a major economic, environmental and political issue. According to international law, these resources should be managed cooperatively under international fisheries agreements (IFAs). This paper studies the formation and stability of IFAs through a coalition game that accounts for both direct consumptive values (harvesting profits) and non-consumptive values of the fish stock per se. The results show that accounting for non-consumptive values helps conserve the fish stock in that equilibrium fishing efforts are smaller and fish stock larger than without non-consumptive values under all possible coalition scenarios (full, partial and no cooperation). However, considering non-consumptive values does not affect the outcome of the game in terms of the prospects for cooperation: even with substantial non-consumptive benefits, the outcome is full non-cooperation. Hence, the trap of non-cooperation in international fisheries management cannot be overcome simply by explicitly accounting for non-consumptive values within IFAs. It is suggested that strengthening the role of IFAs and limiting the ability of non-member countries to free-ride be further investigated as measures fostering cooperation.
Introduction
Disputes over the management of shared fish stocks seem everlasting. Conflicts are particularly persistent when a fish stock is harvested by several countries in the high seas. Countries and groups with a stake to such a shared stock may have markedly different views of the optimal management strategy. Despite the mutual advantages to be gained through cooperative harvesting, establishing and sustaining cooperation has proven difficult.
The strategic interactions pertaining to the harvesting of shared fish stocks have been studied extensively applying game theoretic modelling tools, starting with the seminal paper by Munro (1979) . A survey on the developments made in the three decades following Munro's seminal work can be found in Bailey et al. (2010) . Over the recent years applications of game theory to the management of shared fish stocks continued to emerge (e.g. Brandt and Kronbak, 2010; Breton and Keoula, 2014; Hannesson, 2013; Jensen et al., 2015; Kulmala et al., 2013; Punt et al., 2013) . A topic that received particular attention is the formation of international fisheries agreements (IFAs), which involve several countries joining together to manage a fish stock. Coalition formation games have become the standard tool to address the formation of IFAs since the introduction of the partition function game approach by Pintassilgo (2003) . The coalition formation literature on IFAs has been steadily growing (Pintassilgo et al., 2015) .
The game theoretic literature on shared fishery resources has largely focused on the payoff derived from harvesting fish. Yet a significant part of the total economic value of marine resource stocks may be attributable to benefits aside from direct consumption of products from the stock (e.g., Ferrara and Missios, 1998; Loomis and White, 1996; Mazzanti, 2001; Turner et al., 2003 assumed to be maximizing overall net benefits, non-consumptive values cannot be ignored in deriving an optimal outcome (see e.g. Alexander, 2000; Ferrara and Missios, 1998; Yamazaki et al., 2010) . However, despite the potentially significant role of non-consumptive values in determining optimal management strategies, the combination of game theory and non-consumptive values in the analysis of shared fishery resources is scarce − to our knowledge, only two previous papers, Missios and Plourde (1997) and Ferrara and Missios (1998) , have addressed non-consumptive values and strategic considerations. These papers show in a two-country framework that non-consumptive values reduce the total harvest relative to the case of only consumptive values, and may have important implications for the strategic behavior of countries with an interest in the resource stock. The contribution of the present paper is that it extends the analysis of coalition formation in fisheries management to the case where at least one country derives non-consumptive values from the resource stock. While many internationally shared fishery resources are harvested by several rather than by just two countries, the models developed in Ferrara and Missios (1998) and Missios and Plourde (1997) can only be applied to the case where a fish stock migrates across the boundaries between the waters of just two nations. Analyzing the potential for self-enforcing international agreements on fisheries management in this case calls for analyzing coalition formation rather than two-country bargaining solutions.
Ferrara and Missios (1998) considered a two-country, two period game where at least one of the countries receives benefits attributable to the size of the fish stock, and hence allow for non-consumptive values. The model was used for studying the total harvest and catch shares between the two countries.
3 The Nash bargaining approach was applied as a solution concept, whereby the product of the two countries objective functions was maximized over the two periods. The model was solved backwards by first computing the second period catch shares. In the first part of the paper only one country, labeled the home country, receives non-use benefits from the fish stock. The result is based on the equi-marginal principle where the marginal benefit from direct consumptive use is set equal to the marginal non-use value of the home country. This equality was used as a self-enforcement condition in the first period. The result from the first period is that accounting for nonuse value increases the stock size and reduces harvest. We show that considering non-consumptive values is not sufficient for avoiding the trap of non-cooperation in a coalition formation framework: Although accounting for non-consumptive values decreases the aggregate fishing effort under all possible coalition structures (full, partial and no cooperation), the outcome of the game is full non-cooperation. This result persists regardless of the magnitude of the nonconsumptive benefits. In their bargaining analysis Ferrara and Missios (1998) conclude that the equilibrium stock size increases with nonconsumptive values. We demonstrate that while cooperation and the inclusion of non-consumptive values in the objective function work in the same direction in that both lead to the conservation of the shared fish stock, full non-cooperation remains the outcome of the game, even when all players assign non-consumptive value to the stock.
In our approach, as in Ferrara and Missios, players receive benefit from both harvest and the level of the fish stock. Similar approaches in a general resource extraction context include, among others, Alexander (2000), Conrad and Clark (1987) , Harstad and Liski (2012) and Lasserre and Smulders (2013) . Conrad and Clark (1987) is an early example of a social welfare function that attributes value to the stock itself, referred to as the preservation value of the stock by the authors. Alexander (2000) analyzed the implications of non-consumptive values for species' survival. He concluded that models and policies that fail to consider non-consumptive values are likely to result in inappropriately low optimal population levels. Harstad and Liski (2012) compared extraction levels by several non-cooperating resource users to socially optimal extraction levels in a model where each user values the stock as well as extraction from the stock. Their focus was on inefficiencies arising from strategic behavior, whereas solutions for overcoming such inefficiencies were left as a topic for future research. Furthermore, their stylized model setup assumed that the stock size is exogenously given, so conservation aspects were not addressed. Lasserre and Smulders (2013) modelled the interactions between renewable and non-renewable natural resources, allowing for the possibility that society derives direct utility from resource stocks. While Lasserre and Smulders did not carry out a full analysis of non-consumptive values and resource extraction, they concluded, based on surveys, that this link is of importance.
In a fisheries context, Yamazaki et al. (2010) showed that accounting for non-consumptive values is an important issue for optimal marine reserve design and substantially decreases the frequency of rotating of non-fishing areas. Finally, while non-consumptive values and strategic behavior among resource users has received relatively short shrift, game theory was incorporated as a tool for estimating non-use values already in the 1970′s when Randall et al. (1974) suggested using bidding games to reveal respondents willingness to pay for environmental improvements in contingent valuation surveys.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops a bio-economic model and a coalition formation model that incorporate both harvesting and non-consumptive values of the fishery. The coalition formation game is solved backwards. Section 3 describes countries' optimal effort strategies in the second stage of the game and discusses the implications of non-consumptive values for equilibrium harvest levels under different coalition structures. Section 4 analyses the countries' membership decision in the first stage of the game and discusses the effect of non-consumptive values on the size of the coalition. Section 5 extends the model to account for asymmetries in non-use values, before discussion and conclusion in Section 6.
Bioeconomic model and coalition formation model with nonconsumptive values
Modelling the formation of an international fisheries agreement requires two main components: a bioeconomic model describing stock dynamics, harvest functions, revenues, fishing costs, and possible nonconsumptive benefits; and a coalition formation model, that is, a game showing the strategic interactions between the different players, here countries. We next outline the bioeconomic model and the coalition formation game in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
We consider three countries exploiting a transboundary fish stock. Each country receives consumptive benefits from harvest as well as non-consumptive benefits from the fish stock per se. The non-consumptive values considered here may entail both non-use values (option value, existence value, or bequest value) and non-consumptive use values (such as fish watching as recreational activity, or ecological functions). Initially we assume that the three countries are symmetric with regard to prices, costs, and non-consumptive values. The threecountry setting is a modelling choice due to complexity arising from introducing a non-linear non-consumptive value component; a threeplayer game is analytically tractable yet maintains all the main components of a coalition formation game.
The bioeconomic model
By assumption, the growth of the fish stock follows a logistic growth function (2). Let X denote the size of the fish stock, and H i and E i the harvest and fishing effort of an individual country i. The relation between the fish stock, the harvests, and the fishing efforts exerted by the three countries is given by the following three equations:
